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Monopoly Power in Domestic Production, Smuggling, and the Non-
Equivalence Between Tariffs and Quotas
Abstract
During the last thirty years, one of the most popular research topics in international trade has been the non-
equivalence among policy instruments such as specific and ad valorem import tariffs, voluntary export
restraints and import quotas. The non-equivalence principle was shown to hold under revenue/rent seeking
behavior (Vousden, 1990), under uncertainty (Young and Anderson, 1982), and in the presence of retaliation
(Melvin, 1986; Syropoulos, 1994). Furthermore, it has been shown that different policy instruments have
different effects on the stability of world prices (Zwart and Blandford, 1989) in addition to having different
effects on the quality/composition of imports (Falvey, 1979; Das and Donnefeld, 1987). Perhaps the best
known case of non-equivalence is the one described by Bhagwati (1965, 1969) where domestic production is
controlled by a monopolist. For a given volume of imports, an import tariff generates a lower domestic price
and less deadweight loss than an import quota. Casual empirical evidence from developing and developed
countries alike indicates that highly distorted prices, resulting from trade and domestic taxes, provide
consumers and firms the necessary incentives to engage in various types of illegal activities usually referred to
as smuggling. In spite of the prevalence oft his by-product of government intervention, it is often ignored for
policy analysis purposes. In this paper, we revisit Bhagwati's non-equivalence when domestic production is
controlled by a monopolist and allow smuggling activities to t^e place when the differential between the
domestic price and the world price is high enough.
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MONOPOLY POWER IN DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, SMUGGLING, AND
THE NON-EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN TARIFFS AND QUOTAS
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last thirty years, one of the most popular research topics in international trade has been
the non-equivalence among policy instruments such as specific and ad valorem import tariffs, voluntary
export restraints and import quotas. The non-equivalence principle was shown to hold under revenue/rent
seeking behavior (Vousden, 1990), under uncertainty (Young and Anderson, 1982), and in the presence of
retaliation (Melvin, 1986; Syropoulos, 1994). Furthermore, it has been shown that different policy
instruments have different effects on the stability ofworld prices (Zwart and Blandford, 1989) in addition to
having different effects on the quality/composition of imports (Falvey, 1979; Das and Donnefeld, 1987).
Perhaps the best known case of non-equivalence is the one described by Bhagwati (1965, 1969) where
domestic production is controlled by a monopolist. For a given volume of imports, an import tariff
generates a lower domestic price and less deadweight loss than an import quota.
Casual empirical evidence from developing and developed countries alike indicates that highly
distorted prices, resulting fi-om trade and domestic taxes, provide consumers and firms the necessary
incentives to engage in various types of illegal activities usually referred to as smuggling. In spite of the
prevalence of this by-product of government intervention, it is often ignored for policy analysis purposes.
In this paper, we revisit Bhagwati's non-equivalence when domestic production is controlled by a
monopolist and allow smuggling activities to t^e place when the differential between the domestic price
and the world price is high enough.
The paper is organizedas follows: Bhagwati's rion-equivalenc^ and recent extensions are discussed
in the next section. The model is introduced in the third section. At first, a quota and its import-equivalent
specific and ad valorem tariffs are compared in terms of their effects on domestic output and welfare
without smugglmg. We showthat the specific tariff dominates the ad valorem tariff which dominates the
quota. Smuggling is then introduced m themodel and its effects on domestic production and welfare are
assessed under an ad valorem tariff and then under a quota. A comparison of these policy instruments
reveals that, in the presence of smuggling, the dominance of thead valorem tariff over the quota no longer
holds. We also show thatunder a quota, smuggling can increase welfare. Finally, we extend the ranking of
policy instruments under smuggling to include the specific tariff. Our results suggest that the latter remains
the best instrument.
II. BHAGWATI'S NON-EQUIVALENCE AND EXTENSIONS
Professor Bhagwati has compar^ tariffs and quotas when domestic production is controlled by a
single firm under various assumptions regarding the behaviors of foreign suppliers and import quota
holders. The two panels ofFigure 1do not reproduce all ofBhagwati's (1969) scenarios but present the
main argument behind the non-equivalence. In the left panel, co is the world price/foreign export supply
schedule consistent with the large country assumption, ©(I+r) is the tariff-distorted foreign export supply
schedule, R is the import quota, and Dis the domestic demand curve. To ensure that the subsequent tariff-
quota comparison involves import-equivalent policy instruments, R is set equal to the level of foreign
exports under the ad valorem tariff. The right panel illustrates three residual demand curves, defined as the
difference between domestic demand and the policy-distorted foreign export supply schedules. The
domestic monopolist s margmal cost curve is labelled MC. Under free trade, the domestic firm faces the
residuM demand curve D-DR"-D which is more elastic than the tariff-distorted residual demand curve Dt-
Dt'-D. Under the quota, the foreign export supply schedule is given by co when the quota is not binding and
is perfectly inelastic when exports equal R. This vertical segment ofthe foreign export supply schedule
makes the quota-distorted residual demand curve (DR-DR'-DR"-D) less elastic except at domestic prices
low enough to make the quota non-binding. MR^ and MR,^ are the marginal revenue curves associated
with the tanff and quota-distorted residual demand curves. The profit maximizing monopolist chooses the
quantity that equalizes its margmal revenue to its marginal cost. Thus, the optimal quantity produced under
the advalorem tanff is which exceeds the quantity Qj^ produced under the import-equivalent quota.
The tariff equilibrium is characterized by a lower domestic price than the quota equilibrium (P^ <P"),
which implies the dominance ofthe tariff over the quota. This dominance is more obvious when the foreign
export supply curve is infintely elastic, as under the small country assumption. In that case, the segment Dt
-Dt ofthe tanff-distorted residual demand curve is perfectly elastic and acts as aprice ceiling.
Other authors have revisited Bhagwati's non-equivalence. Sweeney, Tower, and Willett (1977)
assume that the government uses a tariffor quota to attain a targeted imports/domestic production ratio.
When the policy instrument is perceived as exogenous by the monopolist, they show that a quota leads to a
higher domestic price and hence lower welfare than a tariff. However, the equivalence between the two
mstruments holds when the rule used by thegovernment to set thepolicy instrument is taken intoaccount in
the decision-making process of the monopolist. Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) have replaced the
assumption of a monopolist firm by a cartel of firms and found that the cartel's incentives to deter
deviations from collusive behavior will bring about a lower price under a quota than under a tariff.
Kaempfer, Marks, and Willett (1988) relax the small coimtry assumption andcompare the welfere
implications oftariffs and quotas generating equivalent producer rents for a domestic monopolist. They
find that quotas induce higher- domestic prices, higher volumes (and price) of imports and hence less
overproduction thw tariffs at high levels of producer rents. Consequently they conclude that quotas are
more (less) efficient than tanffs at high (low) levels ofprotection. They also show thathigher world prices
and higher levels of imports are sufficient conditions for foreign countries to prefer the quota. Finally^
Kaempfer, McClure andWillett (1989) explores the non-equivalence issue byholding constant the domestic
price in the tanf&'quota comparison. Their small country political economy setting assumes that the
government provides protection for a domestic monopolist selecting the policy instrument that meets the
domestic price target at the lowest welfare cost. They show that for low tariffs, price-equivalent quotas
may not exist-while iat high levels ofprotection, the ranking oftariffs and quotas depends upon the domestic
monopolist's market share under free trade. Quotas dominate tariffs when, at the free trade equilibrium, the
monopolist has a market share of less thanfifty percent.
III. THE MODEL
We adopt the modeling strategy ofmany previous studies and use a partial equilibrium model
based on the assimiptions ofa homogenous product, endogenous terms oftrade and monopoly in domestic
production. The model is presented in two parts. First, the behavior ofthe monopolist is analyzed without
smuggling. It is shown that neither a tariff nor a quota isanoptimal policy under these circumst^ces and
thatthespecific tariffis a better policy instrument than the ad valorem tariffand that both tariffs dominate
the quota. Inthe second part, the behavior ofthe smugglers is described and the effect of smuggling onthe
monopolist's behavior is investigated.
i^Themonopolist'sbehaviorwithout smuggling. Inthis case, imports cancome only from legal channels
suchthat legal imports L equals total imports I. Domestic price (or inverse demand), as shown in equation
(1), depends upon domestic consumption, which is the sum of imports I and domestic production Q
(D=I+Q). The endogenous world price P® is an increasing function of thevolume of imports as shown by
equation (2). Domestic production is done by a single firm whose cost of production C depends on its
output level Q as shown by equation (3).
P'' = (9(/ +0); &=[deidD)<0, D=[l +Q) (1)
P" =(o{I)\ Gj's {doldl)>0 (2)
C=C{Q); C3{dC/dQ)>0-, C'^ [d^cldQ^)-^Q (3)
Themonopolist is assumed to be a profit maximizing firm. Under free trade, arbitrage implies that world
and domestic prices will be equalized. In the presence of import tariffs (which may, for now, include both
advalorem tariffs (at rate t ) and specific tariffs (t)), the arbitrage condition implies:^
e{I +Q)-{^+t)(o{I) -t^O; 1{0(1 +Q)-{U - r} =0 (4)
where (4) holds with equality when imports occur. From (4), assuming I>0, defines:
(5)
where a subscript denotes partial differentiation. If trade is instead restricted by import quotas (of
magnitude i2), the arbitrage condition implies:
e{I +Q)-(o(I)<0; I<R- (fi-7){0(/ +e)-®(/)} =O (6)
Assuming thequotais binding, then(bydefinition) /g = 0 .
The firm's profit is given by equation (7), while the monopolist's profit-maximizmg first order
condition is given by (8):
n'' =e{I +Q)Q-C{Q) , (7)
{eK"|^ Q)^J{Q,I{Q,t,r\r)=e+ffQ[^+Ig)-C=0 (8)
Note that the specific tariff rate, t, enters the FOC indirectly only through its impact on imports (/),
whereas the ad valorem tariff rate enters both indirectly (through I) anddirectly (through Iq ). Also note
that under a (binding) tariff: 1+ /g <1, whereas under a (binding) quota 1+ /g =1. Equation (8)
determines the monopolist's output in terms of the trade policy instruments: . We assume:
ASSUMPTION I: With tariffs, the profit-m^cimizing output level of the monopolist is an increasing
fimction of the (specific or ad valorem) tariff rate; > 0, > 0 • If quotas are used, the
optimal output level is a decreasing fimction ofthe quota level; [dffI<0.
Discussion: As is well-known, the SOC does not guarantee how changes in tariffs (or imports) shift the
marginal revenue curve. The assumptions we make are comparable to the assumption of strategic
substitutes in the strategic trade policy hterature. Mathematically, the SOC require: Jq+JjJq <0.
Since, from (5), {^{Q,t,x)jd^ <0, the assumption that domestic monopoly output increases with the
specific tariff implies Jj<^. This, in turn, implies that Jq<^ for the SOC to hold. Similarly, for
quotas, the assumption > 0 implies < 0.
Under the monopoly solution, domestic price exceeds marginal cost, which is inefficient from a
welfare standpoint. A second source of inefficiency arises under free trade, since domestic price equals
world price (rather than the marginal cost of imports). One trade policy instrument cannot remove both
sources of inefficiency andhence cannot bebyitself a first-best policy instrument. A combination ofpolicy
mstruments could support the first best solution by restricting imports to obtain the optimal world price and
by subsidizing imports enough to exogenize the domestic price in the eyes of themonopolist. Tariffs and
quotas, if usedindividually, canbeused to extract rents from trade partners but cannot address the issue of
market power in the domestic market. Since these policy instruments generate different residual demand
curves, domestic price and hence welfare are dependent upon the choice of commercial policy instrument.
The following proposition compares the effects of quotas, specific and ad valorem tanfifs on domestic
production when smuggling is not feasible. It complements Bhagwati's (1969) comparison between an ad
valorem tariff and a quota by including a specific tariff..
PROPOSITION 1: Without smuggling, if a domestic monopolist produces the import-competing good,
domestic production is higher under a specific tariffthan under an import-equivalent ad valorem tariff,
and domesticproduction is higher under an ad valoremtariffthan under the import -equivalent quota.
PROOF-. Ceterisparibus, output is higher the more elastic is the residual demand curve. As is well-known,
imder monopoly the import-equivalent quota results in lower domestic ou^ut than either tariff since the
residual demand curve is less elastic, and hence marginal revenue is lower under the quota than imder the
tariff. To compare the two types of tariffs, it is apparent from (5) and (8) that, given QJ, marginal
revenueis a decreasingfunction of r. Thus, raising the specific tariffand lowering the ad valorem tariff in
order to hold imports constant will increase domestic output. From the FOC, we have:
JgdQ+Jjdl + Jjdr = 0 . Under Assumption I, Jg <0, and
j<0, thus, increasing tand decreasing r, such that imports
A
do not change, will lead to higher domestic output . QED
This proposition is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The right panel of each figure shows the residual
demand curves and their corresponding marginal revenue schedules. The second part of the proposition is
illustrated in Figure 1 which has been described in the previous section. Nevertheless,'it might be useful to
recall that Dt-Dt'-D and DR-DR'-DR"-D are the residual demand curves when "import-equivalent" ad
valorem tariff t and quota R are imposed. The more elastic tariff-distorted residual demand induces the
monopolist to produce more than under an import-equivalent quota. The comparison between import-
equivalent specific and ad valorem tariffs is pictured in Figure 2. It confirms that production is higher
underthe specific tariffthan under the ad valoremtariff, a result specificto the large country assumption.
The welfare level generated by the commercial policy instruments can be measured by adding up
consumer surplus, the monopolist's profit and the government revenue generated by the policy instrument.
After some simplifications, it can be shownthat the level of welferecan be represented by:
IV= j{e{D)dD}-C{Q)-a}(l)l (9)
0
Smce tariffs and quotas alter both domestic production and imports, total differentiation of equation (9)
with respect to Q and I shows how welfare varies with these instruments:
dW={0-C}dQ+{(9- (fi> + . (10)
As usual, welfare maximization entails the equality among domestic price, the domestic marginal cost of
production, and the marginal import cost. With monoopoly, two policy instruments are needed to generate
this equilibrium. Given the second-best nature of the tariffe and the quota, two issues need to be addressed:
i) the magnitude ofthe second-best tariff and ii) the welfare ranking ofthe second-best tariffs and quota.
PROPOSITION 2: Under the conditions of Assumption 1: (i)the second-best tariff rate exceeds the
reciprocal oftheforeign export supply elasticity; and (ii)the specific tariffdominates the second-best ad
valorem tariffwhich in turn dominates the optimal second-best quota.
PROOF: Consider the second-best quota. Introducing a quota at the fi-ee-tradelevel (discontinuously)
lowers domestic output and thus lowers domestic welfare; thus, the optimal quota may be "infinite". The
condition for a locallyoptimal quota (R) is givenby:
—fa , T/i v fzi _ fa f^\^Q
dR
since 9>C due to monopoly behavior and < 0 by assumption. Thus, the (locally) optimal quota
is chosen so that domestic price exceeds the marginal cost of imports (a smaller quota is used to encourage
domestic production). If the globally optimal quota is "infinite" (fi'ee trade), then eithertariff will improve
upon the free trade solution (as shown below). If the globally optimal quota is interior, then from
Proposition 1 a tariff which yields the same level of imports will result in higher domestic output. Thus,
from (10), it follows that, given imports, the increase in domestic output raises welfare.
The comparison of specific and ad valorem tariffs is similar. The ad valorem tariff solves:
dt
={e- c')—+{0- (a>+icD'ff—=o^{e-(a+/©')} =-{e- (12)
dr dr [dl/dr j
By assumption I, (dQ/dr)>0 which implies (dl/dr) <0 . Hence, under domestic monopoly, the second-
best tariffimplies >0-^t*>(2(o*/(o) .
Finally, from Proposition I, the specific tariff that results in the same level of imports as the optimal ad
♦
valorem tariff yields higher domestic output and hence higher welfare. Thus, the optimal specific tariff
must dominate the optimal ad valorem tariff. QED
Intuitively, since the monopoly position of the local firm yields too little output at the traditional
optimal tariff, it is desirableto stimulateproduction witha highertariff.
(jX)The monopolist's behavior and smuggling. We assume there are a largenumber of smugglers who
behave competitively. Thedomestic pricedepends ondomestic production Q and total imports I, where I is
the sum ofaggregate legal imports L and aggregate illegal imports S=^Sj. Generally, the profits of
smuggler i, as shown below, depend on the domestic price, P'' =0{Q +L+S), the probability that
smuggled imports will be seized at the border, 1-A, the cost to obtain the smuggled goods
price and a a terms of trade parameter specific to illegal imports) and
its other costs The latter are assumed to depend on the individual and aggregate volumes
smuggled si and S. assumed to be increasing in S to introduce a congestion effectthat makes the
individual smuggler usemore expensive routes tomaintain the probability ofnotgetting caught at X:
7tl ={Xe-aeo)s^-x{Si,Sy,^ ^>X (13)
The parameter a is expected to be greater orequal to one inmost situations, which implies illegal importers
can notget a better price on imports than legal importers. However, it is conceivable that people escaping
commercial taxes may be able to avoid domestic taxes in the exporting countries so that a<l cannot be
ruled outcompletely. The free entry zero profit condition determines the individual smuggler's volume and
the niunber of smugglers. For simplicity we assume that the smuggler's cost is linearwith respect to its
own volume of smuggling and thatall smugglers areidentical. Asmuggler's profit canthen bewritten as:
==[{W-aQ))~7j{S)]si (14)
where ti(S) is the marginal and average private cost ofsmuggling.^ An interior solution (S>0) requires that
'n(S)/A, = (0 - 6©), where &=a/X. Smuggling will not occur if ti(0)/A, > (0 - So). Another comer solution
could occur when legal imports aremore expensinve than illegal imports (legal imports cease). This rarely
observed case is notwithout interest since Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) have shown that a smuggling-only
equilibrium candominate a no-smuggling equilibrium if theterms of trade gamis sufficiently large.
IV. SMUGGLING AND THE AD VALOREM TARIFF
For a given tariff rate, the monopolist's output decision influences the composition of imports
(between legal and illegal). In general, for high levels of domestic output, the gap between world and
domestic prices will be small, andsmuggling will benonexistent. However, as the domestic firm reduces its
output level, the profitability of smuggling increases. It is possible, for some tariff rates, that at low
domestic outputlevels all imports will be diverted to illegal channels. Since, as shown below, the residual
demand curve facing the monopolist is unaffected by smuggling, as long as legal imports and smuggling
coexist, the smuggling affects the monopolist's behavior only when legal imports cease.^
(i)Derivmg the residual demand curve under smuggling: The tariff-distorted residualdemandcurve
pictured in Figure 1 is characterizedby a kink. The introduction of smuggling is tantamount to adding
another sourceof competition which addsanother kink to the residual demand curve. To identify the
conditions supporting the three different kindof equilibria (S=0, L>0; S,L>0; S>0,L=0), it is necessaryto
locate the kinks on the residual demand curve facing the monopolist. To derive the residual demand curve,
recall the arbitrage condition for importers:
6{1 +Q)<{^+ T)co{I) for legal imports, with equality ifany legal imports occur; (15)
0(I +Q)<Sa}{l)+(ji[S)/Xy, Sg[0,/] with equality if.S^O. (16)
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If some legal imports enter the country, then (15) holds with equality. Define l\Q,r) such that:








represents the level of imports, as a function of domesticoutput, assuming some legal imports
enter the country. The monopolist's residual demand curve, assuming legal imports occur, is P\Q, r):
P\Q,r)=^G{Qj\Q,T)), where: = =
+rXl+*:)) >0; k= >0;
If the disparity between world and domesticprices is small, no smuggling will occur. Thus, define
Qq{t\ I^{t) as the threshhold level ofoutput (and hence imports) such that:
where: l\QQ{t),t) =I^{t)
It is readily shown that P\Qyt)- 6q)(i\Q, t)) is adecreasing fimction ofQ, and an increasing function
of r; hence, it follows that for 0> 03(r) (/</o(r)) no smuggling will occur, whereas for Q<Qq(t)
{!> 1q(t) ) smuggling will occur^ Assuming some legal imports occur, the level ofsmuggling is given by:
5 =0 if Q'^Qo{t)^ 1 where: (dQQ/cir)>0 and {dI^ldT)<0
S{Q,t). P'{Q,T)-Sa{l<{Q,T)]-{riS)IX) =Q for e<a(r)
Further, define: i^(r)=P'(Q3(r),r); thus, /{, represents the domestic price such that no smuggling (just)
occurs. Smce: = + and (<a7o/i/r) <0, it follows that: (i3JPo/<^r)<0,
a result we iise later. This result states that the increase inoutput necessary to deter smuggling following a
rise in the tariff rate induces a fell in the domestic price. Smuggling is profitable only if; P\Q, t) >io(^) •
As domestic output shrinks, imports increase - asdoes the differential between domestic and world prices;
hence, smuggling also increases. If the tariffishigh enough, then for sufficiently low ou^ut (high import)
levels smuggled imports may entirely replace legal unports. Denote/'(0) asthe level ofimports and




r{Q) s.t. e{Q+r)=&o{r)+[7ii')lA), p'{Q)=e{Q+r);
(rf/Vrfe) =(-^/(1+ //)); {dPidQ) ={ff/{UM)).
(20)
Legal imports will cease ifP\Q,t)>P^{Q), i.e., if {^+T-S)a){l)-(rf^l)IXf^>^. Define:
(i(7, r) = (1 +r - d)ct}(I) - >0 (21)
where the strict inequality implies legal imports are unprofitable (7^(0>/^(g,r) inthis domain). Since I
depends inversely on and since (i(/o(r),r)<0, an all smuggling equilibrium can occur only if®;
(1+r-^)®'-(7?y;i)]>0 (22)
Fmally let ii(r) be the output, import and price schedules such that legal imports justvanish:
(1+r- ^)<B(/i(r)) - ()</i(r))/A)=0; ^(t) =e{Q,{T)+/,(z-)) =<fe(/,(T)) +{r]{UT))/X] (23)
It is readily shown that {ciQ^{T)/dT)>0>(dI^{T)/dr) if {\ +T-S)(o'{l)-{Tf{l)/X)>0. Hence, the
domestic price at which legal imports cease is adecreasing fimction ofthe tariff rate <O) since
thehigher tariffsmake smuggling more attractive. We shall usethis result shortly.
To summarize, the legal imports-only, coexistence, andsmuggling-only equilibria occur when
when: and S = Q
when: Qe{Q,{T),Qo{T))^ P'(Q,T)e{P^it),P,{T)) and Se{0,l'{Q,r))
when Q<Q^iT)-^P'(Q,T)>P'(T) and S=r{Q)
Actual imports are given by^°: I''{QyT) =Max l'{Q,T),r{Q) , and the actual domestic price is given by:
P''{Q,t) =Min P'{QfT),P'{Q) . Note that the residual demand curve is more elastic under the smuggling-
only scenario than imder a scenario allowing only for legal imports if: {^+T-S)o}\I)-(7]'{l)/X)>0,
which is precisely the condition that is required toallow a smuggling-only outcome. Figure 3 illustrates the
residual demand curve facing themonopolist, assuming the tariffrate is such that all three cases canoccur.
The flatter segment (A'B") of the residual demand curve corresponds to the smuggling-only case while
coexistence of legal and illegal imports can only occur along the B"C' segment. The legal-only and no-
import scenario segments are respectively delimited by CD" and D"E. Note that the slope ofB"D" is equal
12
to the slope of Dt-Dt' in Figure 2 and that an increase in the tariffpushes B" to the right, thus extending
the elastic segment and confimiing animportant property of Q^{t)
(ii)Monopolist Output Choice. The monopolist's profit function is given by:
7t{Q,T;) =P''{Q,T)Q-C{Q) where: for Q<Q,{r)-, for Q>Q,{t) (24)
From (24), it is apparent that the residual demand curve iscontinuous, butnot dififerentiable at &(r). This
kink, represented by B" in Figure 3, brings about the following marginal profit expressions:
(<ar/<^) =0(e+r) +e-^-(1+//)"'-C'(e) when: Q<Q,{r) (25)
{a;^/^) =e(Q+I'(Q,T)) +Q•ff{^+K)-'-C{Q) when Q>Q,{t) (26)
Because thederivative is discontinuous at 2i(^)» the possibility ofmultiple local optima arises. However,
for (1 + r - (yliy'f/) - i7f{l)lx\ >0, K<fi and hence: lim > lim (^/^) • Thus,
assuming ;r(2) is concave ineach domain, there isa unique optimum. Define such that:
solves-. {^/SQ) =0{Q+r)+Q-ff{:+fiy^-C{Q)=O
Q\t) solves-. {a^/^) =e{Q+l'{Q,T)) +Q•ff{^+K)-^-C{Q) =0
isthe monopolist's optimal output ifno legal imports can occur, whereas Q'{t) isoptimal output when
smuggling is not feasible. Thus, the true optimal solution for the monopolist, denoted Q*{t) , is given by:^^
Q'{t) =Q'< Q^{t) if MQ+r)+Q-0'{l+/if-C{Q)) <0
^ ''aW
e'w=2,w if {e(Q+i')+Q-ff{\+Mf-ciQ)] >o> (fl(e+/')+e-0'{i+'^ r'-c'(e))
^ 'a(r) ^ ^ ' 'a(r)
e'W=!2'M>a(r) if 6[Q^VYQ'&(\^Kf-CiQ) ^ >0
For small x, the divergence between world and domesticprices will be small, and the monopolist's optimal
choice will result in no smuggling. As the tariff rate increases, the demand for the monopolist's output
increases; while the higher tariff need not increase marginal revenue, we assume it does (a condition
guaranteedwith linear demands and marginal cost). Thus, usingAssumption I:
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PROPOSITION 3; Consider the monopoly solution with both the threat of legal and illegal imports.
Further, assume that, with legal imports, the monopoly solution is such that output and domesticprice
increase with the tariffrate. Then there exist tariffrates fg < < T2
for r^To, Q\t)=Q\t), S* =0, /»=/'(0'(r),r); ^>0,
:for rG(ro,ri), Q'{t) =Q'(tI r{r)^^'(r)€(0,/'(r))
dP* „ dS" „ dQ" „ dl* .
>0, >0, -^>0>— >0
dr dx dr dr
for Q\T)=Qlr), S'{t)=I'{t)=I.{t)-, ^<0,
for ..r,, ev)=e'; 5-M=/V)=/1eO; 5=^=^=$=°
PROOF: Define P\t) = + as the domestic price associated with the optimal monopoly
output when legal imports occur. For r =0, P^(r)<Po(^)> where Pq{t) denotes the domestic price at
which illegal imports will just occur. As proven earlier, (a[P'/rfr)>0>(cff^(r)/i/T). Hence, there exists a
Tq such that P^(r)>P(,(T) as r>ro. For r< Tq, 5 =0, whereas 5 >0 for r>ro. That proves
< <
the first part ofthe proposition.
As previously shown, as r increases, P\t) increases, whereas P^(t) (the price at which legal
imports cease) decreases. Thus, define such that P\r^) =P.^{t^ . For i'^(r)
r e(ro,ri)) legal and smuggled imports coexist, proving the second partoftheproposition.
For r > , P\t) >P^(t) and legal imports cease. Define V2 such that 61(72) = ; recalling that
QW is an increasing fimctionofT, itmust be that 6i(i')< for '^ <'^ 2- Thus, for r 6(ri,r2),
lim (djildQ)>^> lim (^/<^), implying the optimal solution in this domain is 2*W=0(^)»'• 6..
at the kinkwhere the smuggling-distorted segment of the residual demand merges with the tariff-distorted
segment. Finally, for r>r2, 0(r)>and =0, implying 0*(z-) = for t>T2- QED
Figure 4 shows the impactof tariffs on output, domestic price, total and smuggled imports and, in
doing so, it illustrates several interesting phenomena. First, for r e(ro,ri), while domestic output and total
imports are not affected by smuggling, legal imports decline and smuggled imports increase with the tariff
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rate. If smuggled imports entail a higher social cost than legal imports, this has implications for the second-
best tariff. Secondly, note that for r > Tj , legal imports cease, and for r e (r j,Tj ) domestic price is actually
a decreasing fimction of the tariff rate dueto the discontinuity in themarginal revenue curve, which results
from the fact that the foreign supply of legal imports is less elastic than that of smuggled imports. The
combination of decreases in smuggled imports and output increases in the domain suggests that the
higher comer solution might be the best tariff rate in that domain. Finally, note that for r > Tj , changes in
the tariff have no further effect. In this domain, where the tariff-distorted schedule of legal imports is
everywhere above the illegal imports schedule, the solution entails what Fishelson and Hillman (1979) calls
"water in the tariff" or redundaiit protection and it is identicalto a ban on legal imports.
(iii)Smuggling and welfarie under an ad valorem tariff. For simplicity, we assume X= 6 = 1, and
that smugglers earn ho profits. Under these conditions t^S)S represents the excess social cost of smuggled,
over legal, imports. Witiiin the context of a partial equilibriimi approach, the welfare function can be
written as, after some simplication:
Q+l
W= \ e{x)dx - C{Q) - m{l) -l-risys (29)
which has the usual interpretation, except that the last term which represents the excess socid cost
associated with smuggling. Consider the optimal choiceofan ad valorem tariff:
{aviat)={e- cx^i^r)+{e-(o- im'jaiar) ~{tj+siX^jdr) m
The first two terms of equation (30) are the ones from which the femiliaroptimal tariff argument is derived,
andthe la^ termrepresents the change in social smuggling costs dueto the change in the tariff rate.
Let T* denote the second-best tariff consistent with equation (30) when smuggling is not possible,
and T denote the second-best tariff in the presence of smuggling. Since 6>C and $~g> at t = 0, it
follows that r*>0 provided (dQldv)>^>(3.ldv).
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PROPOSITION 4; First, if t* ^ Tq, then r-r*; i.e., if the no-smuggling second-best tariff-will not
result in smuggling when the smuggling technology is introduced, the threat ofsmuggling will not affect
the optimal equilibrium.^^ Second, if r* s(ro,ri) then: ro^r<r'; furthermore, the introduction of
smuggling activities lowers welfare.
PROOF: The first claim is trivial since the behavioral rules for output and total imports are unaffected by
smuggling, as long as legal and illegal imports coexist. The second claim follows directly because, in that
domam, the behavioral rules for output and total imports are not affected by the smuggling, but the amount
of smuggling is an increasing function of the tariff. Hence, =-{T]+S7f){cSl^)<Q, implying
the result. The reduction in welfare follows since the domestic output and import levels chosen with
smuggling (and the second-best tariff were feasible without smuggling and since smuggling imposes a
social cost beyond legal imports. Thus, welfaremust be reducedby the smuggling. QED
The above propositiongoes beyondBhagwati and Srinivasan's (1973, p.385) result under the assumption of
a perfectly competitive domestic sector as they could not provide an unambiguous ranking of the second-
best tariffs except under the assumptionof constant-elasticity offers.
Due to the kinks in the residual demand curve, comer solutions are likely. By continuity, the
solution at the kink is influenced by the solutions on either side. The following lemma looks at the size of
the second-best tariff whensmuggling is possible but does notoccur.
LEMMA1: The threat ofsmuggling may reduce thesecond-best optimal tariff, even though the resulting
equilibrium results in no smuggling.
PROOF: Note thatthe welfare function isnot differentiable at Tq; from (30) lim(^/^) > lim
f->r5 . r-»ro
since 7^(0) >0 and Hm (^/^) >0. Thus for some parameter values, the second-best optimal tariff when
r->r5
smuggling is not feasible will exceed Tq butwill equal Tq when smuggling is a threat. Hence, even though
nosmuggling occurs, thethreatof smuggling is sufficient to induce thesetting of a lower tariff QED
Thewelfare analysis of ad valorem tariffs up to now has been limited to tariff rates lowenough so
that illegal imports did not completely replace legal imports {i.e., r <t^). However, we noted earlier that
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ou^ut is increasing and smuggling decreasing inthe domain and that tariff rate increases beyond
t2 have noeffect. The welfare implications ofthese results are captured inthe following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: In thepresence ofsmuggling, it cannotbe sociallyoptimal to choosea tariff rate in
the (rjjTj) domain.
PROOF: In this domain, domestic price is a decreasing function of the tariff rate; hence: S = l,
[dQldt^ + >0 >[^jdt) Furthermore, the arbritage condition states that 9-(0 + r]. Hence,
-S{6>'+i){^ldT)>0. QED
Intuitively, whenall imports are smuggled, the effective pricepaidfor imports is not the world price, but the
domestic price. Sinceincreasing the tariff results in higher output and lower domestic price (i.e., improved
terms oftr^e), welfee must be an increasing function of the tariff rate when r
V. SMUGGLING AND THE QUOTA
(i)Smuggling and domestic production under a quota. Under domestic monopoly, Professor Bhagwati
(1969) has shownthat the range of {output,import} options available under a quota are different from, and
inferior to, those available with a tariff when smuggling is not feasible. Implementing a quota at the free
trade level of imports leads to higher domesticprices and lowerwelfare (the gap betweenmarginal cost and
demand price widens). If the quota is equal to the import level under a tariff, domestic output will be lower
with the quota, implying lower utility (because ofthe discrepancybetweenprice and marginal cost).
The question is how smuggling changes that conclusion. We have shown that, under a tariff,
smuggling lowers welfare '^^ . This result occurs because the presence, or threat, of smugglmg does not
change the monopolist's ouQ3ut unless legal imports are eliminated. We demonstrate in this section that
these results are reversed imder a quota, and that the threat of smuggling can be beneficial. More
concretely, we show that the threat of smuggling raises the contestability of the domestic market and can
induce an increase in domestic ou^ut even though smuggling does not actually occur.
Let R denote the quota limit, and assume the same smuggling technologyas in the previous section.
Define theschedule of outputs and ofprices, Po{R) as follows:
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a(i?) s.t.-. 0(a(i?)+iJ) =<5ffl(i?)+(77(O)/A); {^iR)/a{)={(S(o--ff)/0)<-1; (31)
P„(i?) =0(a(/?)+4 {dPjdR) =0{l+{^,{R)/^R)) =So}'{R)>O (32)
For each R, Q,(/?)is the level of domestic production such that it is just (not) profitable to smuggle any
imports into the economy, and -Po(^) is the corresponding domestic price. Given R, there will be no
smuggling if 2 - Qo{^) >whereas smuggling will occur if Q<Qq(IC) . Thus, there will be a kink in the
monopolist's residual demand at . At lower output levels (Q <Sb(i?)) demand will bemore elastic
because ofthe competition from smugglers, while at higheroutput levels demand is less elastic because of
the usual insulating effect ofthe quota. The domesticprice when output exceeds is:
when Q>Q>{R), 5=0: P^{Q-R)=e{Q+R)- and {^„'l^) =ff{Q +R) (33)
On the other hand, when output falls below Q)(/2) smuggling becomes profitable. The level of
smuggling (S(Q,R)) and the corresponding domestic price are determined by:
S{Q,R) St. e{Q+R+S) =S(o{R+S)+{7]{S)/X}, = (34)
Pf(Q,R) =e{Q+R+S{Q,R)}, = = (35)
where, as defined earlier in the paper, fj =(~^/ Sa)'+{tf/Z) j.
Note that, unlike the case of the ad valorem tariff, smuggled imports do not squeeze out legal
imports, and hence the demand curve appears more elastic tothe monopolist^^. The (formula for the) slope
of the residual demand curve under smuggling is the same as for the residual demand curve under an ad
valorem tariff when all imports are smuggled since the monopolist responds to the elasticity of the
smuggling schedule only when legal imports do not change. For the tariff case, this requires that there be no
legal imports, whereas this need not be the case undera quota.
Equations (33) and (35) reveal that the residual (inverse) demand curve facing the monopolist is
continuous, butnot differentiable at Qq{R). Following the same methodology as for the ad valorem tariff,
the profits on either side ofthe kink can be expressed as:
MQ,R) =Pf{Q+R+S[Q,R))Q-C(Q)-, (atloQ) =Pf +Qff{Ufi)-'-C(Q) when Q<Q^{R).
®(a«)=/'/(e +^)fi-C(e); (^m)=P„' +Qe'-C(Q) when Q>(3o{R)-.
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It follows that: lim {^|^) ={0+Q0\^+-C{Q^>{0-\-Q&-0(ffj)= lim {dTtjSQ) smzt
G->eo(«)r G-»eo(«)r
(1+s(Oj'l) • Assuming the profit fiinction is concave ineach domain, this implies the global concavity
ofthe profit fimction. Define Qn{R) as the profit-maximizing output level when smuggling is not feasible
and as themonopoly output level when only smuggling canoccur. Thus, solve:
Q„{R) solves-. {^/^) =P„'{Q+R) +Qe^-C{Q) =0
QXR) solves-. {3;r/^)=Pj'{Q+R+S)+Qff{UMf-C(Q)=0
Clearly &(/?)>Q„iR)- Finally, define Q*{R) asthe optimal solution for the monopolist. Then:
(36)









since //> 0 and =0. Hence, the optimal solution |g*(i2)>0o(7?)->Q*(i2) =2„(i?).
Similarly, itQXR)<Qo(R),^{o+QH'^ +/jy'-C{Q)] <O-^{0+Qff-C{Q)}^ <0, and
L J Gol«)
hence the optimal solution Q*{R)<Qo{R)->Q*{R) =Qs{^)-
Finally, if Q^R)>Q^iR)>Q„{R),^ \9+Q&{Ufi)-' - C\Q)] >0>{0+Qff-C{Q)]
^ ^QoW
implying the maximum occurs at Q*(R) =2o(^)-
QoW
QED
The discontinuity in the marginal revenue schedule raises the likelihood the firm will choose an output level
that "just" deters- entry by smugglers. Without further assumptions, it is possible that some types of
solutions (e.g., an equilibrium with smuggling) would not emerge. To prevent this, we assume:
AssumptionII: Q^{R)<Qq{R) whenR=0.
Assumption III: Q)(^) at R=Ifi (/^j denotes the fi*ee trade level ofimports)
19
Assumption 11 implies that smuggling costs are low enough tomake smuggling profitable under the autarkic
monopoly solution (R=0), whereas Assumption HI implies that smuggling is not profitable when the quota
is set at the fi*ee trade level ofimports {i.e., the price increase fi*om imposing a quota at the fi"ee trade level
ofimports is less than smuggling costs). If this latter assumption does not hold, then smuggling will occur
for all quota levels less than, or equal to, the fi-ee trade level ofimports. '^ Inwhat follows, we rule out this
possibility to consider equilibria inwhich the threat of smuggling affects the monopolist's behavior. The
following two propositions show that there are unique values ofRthat divide the solution space.
PROPOSITION 7: The assumptions of linear demand, world export supply, marginal cost and
smugglingJunctions suffice to imply the Qj^R) and the Q^R) curves intersect the Qq{R) curve (at most)
once, andwill cut the curvefrombelow^^.
PROOF: Suppose there exists R^ suchthat a(^) =a(^)- From (31), and domestic
price fells asRdecreases. Thus, as we move along the locus:
+{oQq(R^I^>0 under the usual
assumption that (^+2 '^) <0. Given concavity, this in turns implies: Q„{^>Qq{R) as R>Rq.
< <
Next, define R^ be such that 2j(^)=Q)(^) • Thus, as we move along the 0o(^) locus:
+Q '^(1+a) ~ '^(6)) / ^ !jn.im . . .i/n (tjw
dR
=(^+2(1+fT' 1+f +(»• (1 +/<)•'- C"/+
[ { m JJ \ )
Under the lineanty assumption, (^/^) is zero while the remaining terms are positive. Assuming
concavity of the profit function, this implies QXR)>Qo{R) as R>R^. Finally, note that since
{e+Q0-C}
e=eo(R,)
<0, this implies Q„{R^) <Qa{R^), and hence R^<R^.
PROPOSITION 8; Under assumptions (II) and (III) there exists R^>R^>0 such that:
for R>Ii„, Q'iR) =Q„{R},
for R^{R^,R,\ Q'iR) =QoiR);
for R<R„ Q'iR) =Q,{Ry,
QED
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PROOF: It follows from propositions 6 and 7. For /Jq, the Q„{R) locus lies above the Qq{R) locus,
implying the monopoly solution is not affected bythe potential smugglers inthis domain. For R<R^,
implying the optimal value of Q is less than Qq{R). Thus,
Q\R)^QXR) in that domain. Finally, for R&(R^,R^), Hm (^/^^)>0> Hm ,
implying = QED
Figure 5 illustrates how the monopoly solution changes with tiie quota level. The pertinent
segments ofall three output schedules are dashed. For very restrictive quota levels {R <i?,), 2y(/?) is the
reliant schedule and decreases in R give rise to more modest increases in domestic ou^ut than in the
intennediate quota range within which the Qq{R) schedule is relevant. For quota sizes below R^,
the monopolist has to contend with the pressure exerted by the smugglers while at quota sizes above the
monopolist is himself putting pressure on the smugglers to keep them away from the market. Figure 5
shows that smuggling need not occur in order to have an effect on the monopolist's behavior. This is
captured by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 9: ForRe[R^,R^), the threat ofsmuggling increases domestic output, even though no
smuggling occurs. For R<Ry, smuggling will occur, and domestic output will be higher than if no
smuggling werefeasible.
PROOF: It follows directly from theprevious propositions.
This proposition establishes the contrasting impact ofsmuggling under different policy instruments. Under
a tanff, smuggling has no impact on domestic output as long as legal and illegal imports coexist. Only
when all imports are smuggled can smuggling activities lead to a higher domestic output. Thus, smuggling
affects domestic production only at very high tariff rates. By constrast, under aquota in the range (0,R^),
legal and illegal imports always coexist and output is always increased. However, the greatest impact is
observed when no smuggling actually occurs, that is at higher/less restrictive quota levels. The threat of
any smuggling acts as a deterrent onthe monopolist's behavior.
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(y)Smugglmg andwelfare undera quota. The welfere criterion is the same as that used under a
tariff. Naturally, there are no tariff revenues per se, but there are revenues derived from selling the quotas
licenses. The welfare function as defined in equation (29) can be used to determine the effect of smuggling
on domestic welfare in the presence ofa quota.
PROPOSITION 10: For any Re.{R^,R^), the threat of smuggling raises domestic welfare.
Furthermore, if the second-best quota, in the absence ofa smuggling threat, is R* s(R^,Rq), then the
threat ofsmuggling must raise domesticwelfare.
PROOF: For any quota in this region, no smuggling occurs, so the onlyimpact, as compared to the case in
which smuggling is not feasible, is to increase domestic output. Since =(^- C) >0, it follows
that the higher output due to the threat of smuggling is beneficial. The proof of the second part of the
proposition follows directly from the first part, since if the government chooses the same quota, no
smuggling will occur, but domestic outputincreases. QED
The difference between thewelfare implications of smuggling under the quotaand underthe tariff is
worth discussing. Since decreasing R in this "no-smuggling" domain reduces imports, raises domestic
output and reduces the domestic price, it is very likely that the optimal quota in this region is R^. The
second-best quota (if interior) solves:
{m'/m) ={$-C)(dQlm)+{0-co- Iq}') - {lco'+Si\^im) =O (37)
Note that, when smuggling occurs {R <R^) it may beworthwhile to expand the quota to reduce smuggling
even if the marginal cost of legal imports exceeds the domestic price. In the "no-smuggling" domain,
{^^q{R)/^) <-1 and the welfare effects ofan increase in the quota are given by:
Thus, raising the quota will lower welfare in this domain if the marginal cost of imports exceeds the
domestic firm's marginal cost. Though an interior solution cannot be ruled out a priori^ it seems logical to
consider the more restrictive comer solution (/? = ii,) ashighly probable.
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VI. SMUGGLINGAND THE AD VALOREM TARIFF-QUOTA COMPARISON
When different policy instruments are compared, a variable is often chosen to remain constant to
"anchor" the comparison. One variable often used for this purpose is the volume ofunports. The presence
of smuggling complicates matters because legal and total imports may differ, and hence it is not
mmiediately apparent which should be used to compare the two policies. In this section we show that,
because ofthe threat ofsmuggling, there exists a unique critical level oflegal imports such that, if legal
imports are the same under both instruments, the output under the quota will be higher (lower) than under
the tariffas long asthe level oflegal imports is lower (higher) than the critical level. This result can then be
used to(partially) rank the quota and the advalorem tariffwhen smugglmg isfeasible.
Since legal imports will be held constant in the subsequent tarifPquota comparison, it is useftil to
express output under the tariff as a function ofthe (resulting) legal import level to establish a matching
relation with the appropriate quota level. Before doing so, we state the following:
PROPOSITION 11: With smuggling, a quota that bans legal imports weakly dominates a tariff that
eliminates legal trade.
PROOF: As shown in Figure 4, any tariff r> leads to no legal imports. We have also shown that
welfere under the tariff is strictly increasing in t in the interval (r^,r2), and hence the local maximum
occurs at Tj . However, this (or any higher) tariff rate results in the same equilibrium that would pertain
with an absolute ban on (legal) imports. Thus, welfare under a quota ofR=0is the same as that under a
tariffof T>Tj, and therefore dominates any tariff in the interval QED
This is very different than the usual result according to which aprohibitive tariff dominates aquota
because of the remaining threat of imports under the tariff. In this case, ifsmuggling can occur, these
unports under a tariff are not beneficial since the price paid for the imports (including smuggling costs)
exceeds domesticproduction costs.
In the remaining part of this section, we rely heavily on the results upon which Figures 4and 5are
based, that is equations (25), (26), (36) and the propositions describing the behavior of the monopolist
23
under the ad valorem tariff and the quota. We focus attention on cases where legal imports occur and for
simplicity we assume that all functions are linear and that 5 = X=1. We define:
rs(j7'/(3'); thus: K>fu as r^r
< >
where r is the tariff rate at which the slopesof the legal importand smuggled import schedules are equal.
To fecilitate the comparison of tariffs and quotas, we use the notation 0'(r),i'(r),S*(r)} to denote the
solution for output, legal imports and smuggled imports under a tariff. Dueto the previous proposition, we
can restrict attention to the domain r e(0,ri). Inthis domain, legal imports area monotonically declining
function of the tariff rate, and are zero for r> Thus, for r €(0,ri), we can invert the relationship
betwen legal imports and x:
= = r e[0,7^]^re[0,T,]; [dTldL') = '^<0
where V denotes legal imports under the tariffand stands for the free trade level of imports.
Using legal imports under the tariff, let = = denote output,
and smuggling, under thetariffas a function of legal imports. Recalling the definition of Tq as the Ingest
tanff level in the no-smuggling domain, define such that Z^ = ( '^(ro); hence,
5'(z,')=oforr >4, 5*'(r)>oforr <4.
Similarly, let denote the domestic output and smuggling levels under a quota
system, with R denoting the quota on legal imports. Recall that Rq represents the largest quota level such
that the smuggling constraint just affects the monopolist's behavior and that is the smallest quota that
deters smuggling. In order to prove the main propositions regarding the ranking of the ad valorem tariff
and the quota, two minor lemmas need to be proven. The first lemma establishes the magnitude of
relative to . Because ZJ cannot be unambiguously ranked relative to , the second lemma compares
the level of domestic ou^ut under both instruments for the two possible cases.
LEMMA2: <i?o
PROOF: Under a quota of R^, the smuggling (just) does not affect the monopolist behavior ^ shown by
Figure 5. As argued by Bhagwati (1969), output under a tariff that yields the same (legal) imports will be
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higher when smuggling can be ignored: ^^(i2Q)> but this implies:
+ hence, the associated tariff =p{R '^fj must be lower than Tq ,
implying • QED
LEMMA 3; Let R<Min . Then, in this domain either the output under the quota is always
higher, or the output levels cross only once, i.e.,
Q''{R)>Q'{R) \/R<Mm{li,R^ or.
s.t. (^[R)>Q'{R) as R<R'
' < >
PROOF: Note that; (i) the output level under a prohibitive quota is the same as that under a tariff when
T>T2, (ii) for Te(ri,r2), legal imports under the tariff are zero, but output is increasing in t; (iii) output
under the quota is continuous in the quota limit. Hence, for small s,
"Where Thus, forRnearzero.
Next, assume there exists some Re. s.t. Q^{R) =Q'{R^). Smuggling occurs in this
domain and domestic output, imports, and price move according to the schedules to the right of Tq in
Figure 4 (imder the tanfQ and to the left of in Figure 5. By smuggling arbitrage, at the same levels of
output and legal imports, smuggled imports must be the same. Since price, output and total imports arethe
same, equations (25), (26) and (36) tell us that: k =^^t=t. Further, for R<R\ t>t->k <fi.
Thus,, a comparison of (26) and (36) shows that the output level under the tariff will be lower (and
smuggling will behigher). Conversely, for R>i?'—> r <f, and hence output will be higher under the tariff.
QED
The mfbrmation contained in lemmas 2 and 3provide the foundation for the comparison ofoutput
under the two regimes asexpressed inthe following proposition.




PROOF: For both cases, first note that: Q'^ {R)<Q'{R) V >iJg since smuggling is irrelevant inthis
domain. Second, recall that for R^{R^,R^), whereas for all levels of legd imports
Vaxis,\iQ\R,)>Q\R,)-^Q'{R)>Q\R)
Next, assume I^<R^. At i? =4, 5" =0, whereas 5^ >0 (by definition of R^). For smuggling to be
profitable under the quota, it must be that: The first part of the proposition follows
after applying thesecond partoftheprevious lemma and the results intheprevious paragraph.
For I^>R^, consider that, by definition, at ZJ, + 'y(-^) +'?(^) >similarly, for
R&{Ry,R^\ ^e'*(i2)+i?) ={o(i2)+7;(0)}. Thus for R=Ll €[i?i,i2o]) we must have
Q\lI)=Q\lI\ Further, since for
this implies output levels cross only once in this domain. Applying the previous lemma implies the output
levels will not cross in i? <i?j and hence: Q^{R)>Q^[R)^ as R<1^ QED
C01XROLARY:lflfo =R^^Q''(R)>Q"{R) as R<R,.
< >
PROOF: It follows immediatly fi"om the previous proposition.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the results of the previous proposition, andhence showthe comparison of
output levels (and implicitly, smuggling levels) under the two cases. Finally, the aboveproposition can be
used to establish the welfare comparison. For the range oftariffs and quotas of interest ($-co- ii)S =0;
hence, differentiating the welfare fimction and usingthat result in the following propositionyields
dW={9- C)dQ+{e-(0~{L+S)(o')d{L+5)- (;? +SifjdS =
(38)
{$- C)dQ+((9 - - (Z,+S)Q/)dL - {{L+S)o}'+Srf)dS
PROPOSITION 13: Iflegal import levels are the same under the twopolicy instruments, the instrument
which induces the larger level ofdomestic output will also induce the higher level ofwelfare.
PROOF'. The proof is immediate since 9>C and the policywith higher output level must, by "smuggling
arbitrage", result in no higher smuggling levels. However S can be zero for both cases. QED
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The above proposition and Figures 6 and 7 lead to more concrete welfare results which are
presented in the next four propositions.
PROPOSITION 14: Suppose so that output under the tariff is larger (smaller) than output
under the quota if ris less (greater) than i. Let x* denote the second-best tariff. R' the second-best
quota, and L=U{t), the legal import level at which the two policies yield the same solution. Then:
(i)maximized welfare is under the quota if r' > r ; (ii) maximized welfare is higher under
the tariffif R* >L. Finally, if r* <r andR* <L, the two policies cannot generally beranked.
PROOF: The prooffollows from the previous proposition. (i)If r*> r, then bychoosing the quota level
such that R=U(r*), output will be higher under the quota and hence welfare will be higher. This implies
that theoptimal quota must dominate the tariff. (ii)Similarly, if R' >L, then bychoosing r =
output will be higher (smuggling lower)underthe tariff, implying higherwelfare. Thus, the optimal tariff
must dominate the quota. (iii)Finally, if r' <f and Bi <L no conclusion can bereached since neither
policy strictly dominates the other. Thus, while welfare under the quota may be less than welfere under the
tariff at decreases in R may raise welfare under the quota. QED
A similarproposition holds if XJ >
PROPOSITION 15; Suppose >iii, so as R<I^. Then, (i)maximized welfare will
< >
be higher under the quota if r* >Tq , implying i7(r*]<Z5. However, (ii)maximized welfare will be
higher under the tariff if R^ >1^.. Finally, if r* < and R* <1^, the two policy instruments cannot
automatically be ranked.
\
PROOF: Identical to the proofofproposition 14.
Finally, consider whether it is possible to compare the level of the second-best instruments. The
impact ofa change inlegal imports on welfare (via either a quota ora tariff can bemeasured by^^:
[dW/dL) =(0 - CjdQidL)+{e-a>-[L+ ') - ((i+S)a}'+Sif){dSldL) (39)
In general, it is not possible to compare [dQjdl) and {dS/dL) under a quota to their value under a
tariff, However, if the tariff solution leads to legal imports in the region it is clear that, in this
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domain {dQ |^dI)^<~^<{dQ^jdL'jKQ. Hence, letting r',Z,'(r*) denote the optimal solution under a
tariff, andevaluating [dW/dL) fora quota at thatpoint yields:
PROPOSITION 16: If the second-best tariff leads to legal imports in the domain (Rq,R^, then the
secondbest quota willbe more restricitve than the tariff: i.e., R* <
PROOF: The result follows from evaluating equation (30), the optimal policy rule for the tariff, and using
the fact [dQ^ldl] <-1 <{dQf jdl) <0. QED
If the optimal tariff leads to a solution in which smuggling occurs, it is less easy to compare the
levels ofthe optimal policy instruments. However, it can be shownthat:
[d^jdl)<[dQldi)<^, wA^>[dS^jdl)>[dS'ldL) for: (40)
Thus:
PROPOSITION 17: If the second-best tariff x* > f, then the second-best quota will yield lower legal
imports than the second-best tariff.
PROOF: The proof follows from equation (39), and noting that welfare is increasing in output, decreasing
in smuggling and that i^d^jdl)- [dQ'jdl"^ <0, - [dS'ldl)) >0. QED
THE DOMINANCE OF THE SPECIFIC TARIFF WITH SMUGGLING
The contrast between the specific tariff and the two other instruments can best be described by
going back to Figures 1 to 3. First note that the schedule {^ +x)af is steeper than 6) +/, a fact that
explains the superiority of the specific tariff over the other instruments at low enough tariff rates for
smuggling to have no effect (i.e., t ^ tj(Q) ). For t > ^(0) and if> 0, the residual demand curve feeing the
monopolist is such that the first imports enteringwill be smuggled. As the domestic price increases, there
will be a level at which the marginal cost of legaland illegal imports is equal. Let and be the price
and domestic output at which this happens. For Q>Qiy the arbitrage is driven by the cost of illegal
imports such that the monopolist's behavioral rule is: J* =6+Q&{^+-C=0 while for
arbitrage is driven by the specific tariff which implies that = . At
J~ >0>J* and it can be shown that this kink moves to the left as the tariff rate increases
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{i.e., there will be a range of tariffs supporting legal imports-only equilibria
{t<tQ =lipfj and a set of higher tariffs allowing the coexistence of legal and illegal imports {tQ<t < .
Under both sets of tariffs, themonopolist's behavior is consistent with J~ . There is also a setof yet higher
tariffs prohibiting legal imports {t^<t< (2) forwhich the monopolist's output is . Tariffs above ^2 ^so
prohibit legal imports but provide redundant protection and generate the same equilibrium as under ad
va/orew tariff rates t>T2 orimderaquotaR=0.
PROPOSITION 18; Fort <t2, the specific tariffwill result in higher domestic production and hence
higherwelfare than thead valorem tariffand quota generating thesame level oflegal imports.
PROOF: Fromproposition 1 we know that for legal imports-only equilibria, the specific tariff dominates
the other instruments. To showwhy this is also true for <^< <"2 >^^ote that in Figure 3 and fi'om oiir
analysis for the ad valorem tariff and the quota, the behavior captured by is observed along the most
elastic segment of the residual demand curve, that is at tariff rates/prices high enough to eliminate legal
imports or for a quota restrictive enough to make smuggling profitable. With a specific tariff sufficiently
high to have a segment of the residual demand along which legal and illegal imports would coexist, the
smuggling rule() is followed at priceslowenough to prevent legal imports fi-om entering. At prices high
enoughfor legal and illegal imports to coexist, the residual demand has yet a flatter slopewhich triggers the
J~ rule. Thus the marginal revenue curve of the monopolistunder the specific tariffwhen legal and illegal
imports coexist must lie above its counterparts under the quota and the ad valorem tariff. It follows that
domestic output imder the specific tariffwill always be at least as large as that under an ad valorem tariff
or a quota when illegal and legal imports coexist. Finally, when legal imports are zero, we know that for
t.\<t < /j, < 0. This and proposition 13 imply that output and welfare are higher at the lowest
possibleprohibitivetariff level t^ than at any other level abovethat. Therefore smuggling does not alter the
strong dominance ofthe specific tariffover the other instruments. QED
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m CONCLUSION
We have shown that Professor Bhagwati's classic result about the non-equivdence betw^n tariffs
and quotas when a monopolist operates in the domesticmarket is not robust when smuggling takes place.
Hence, it is possible for a quota to dominate an import-equivalent ad valorem tariff, especially if the tariff
rate of the latter is high. Our results appear most pertinent in the wake of the recent tariffication of very
restrictive import quotas. In some cases, like Canadian agricultural products marketed under supply
management programs, the new tariffs exceed 300% and are certainly prohibitive. Minimum access
committments accompany the new tariffs to insure that exporters are not completely driven out. These
minimum access committments act as binding quotas and thus reduce the welfare losses that otherwise
would accompany the switch to tariffs high enough to provide redundant protection and to attract
smugglers.
Future research should address enforcement and evasion issues and explore the implications of
different cost structures for smugglers. Even though we have not analyzed these problems, it can be
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Footnotes
^For simplici^, we assume throughout the paper that the monopolist can not export the good.
^Pushing the argument to the logical extreme, the residual demand curve can be made to look perfectly elastic by
using an ad valorem tariff of (-1) and a specific tariff.
^Under the small country assumption, the specific and advalorem tariffs are equivalent.
It is insightful to rewrite the smuggler's profit as: = Theterm
(0-0))is the gross per unit profit margin ofthe smuggler, (1 - Xp isthe average cost associated with the risk
seizure, (a - i)Q) is the average terms oftrade deterioration cost, and x(^,5") captures the total cost ofthe
resources used in smuggling. The presence ofS in the smuggler's costfimction creates an externality that makes
the marginal social cost of smuggling higher than its private counterpart.
^Due to the hypothesized congestion effect, the marginal social cost ofsmuggling, (77+ifS), exceeds the marginal
private costof smuggling ti. The difference between themarginal social and private smuggling costs is irrelevant
in the positive analysis, but matters in the subsequentwelfareanalysis.
^Naturally, the welfare ofsociety isaffected by the smuggling, but the monopolist's behavior isnot, provided legal
imports enter the country.
' P\Q,T)-SQ)(l\Qyrfl decreases with Qprovided (1+r-<y)>0 ; if (1 +r-^)<0 smuggling can never be
profitable. Also, note that if under theautarky monopoly solution (r 00), smuggling isnotprofitable, then the
threat of smuggling is irrelevant; we assume this is not the case. Finally, it is possible that, for large T, some
smuggling occurs forall ^, inwhich case Qo(t) =00.
^If (1 +T- ^)o>'{l) - <0, itwill never be profitable to smuggle all imports (hence, 0,(r) =0); thus, if
Q}(}) and ;;(/) are linear, anecessary condition for all imports to be smuggled is : T>Ts{S-i)+(7f/A(i>*). If
r > f and (1+r- ^)iy(O) - (7(0)/^) >0, there will be no legal imports {Q^(t) =00).
^Some of these intervals may be degenerate; i.e., Qo(t) -^<x> as X 00; and 2i(r) 0 as x—> 0.
For some level of domestic output, imports - legal or smuggled - will be reduced to zero.
11 "^ \It is also possible touseFigure 3 to show that Qq(t) isincreasing in x. Anincrease in thetariffratemoves B"
down and D" up thus pushing C north east of its original location.
^^Again,if {(1+T-<5y(/)-(V(/)/-l)}<0,, Q^{r) =0,so an all smuggling equilibrium cannot occur.
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We assume that, in the presence of smuggling, this local optimumis the global optimum. As discussed below,
welftre is increasing inTfor t €(ti,T2)
Formally,we have not been shownthat the infinitetariff "smuggling-only" case is inferior to the no-smuggling
^ssible) second-best optimal tariff. However, it seemsvery imlikelythat it would be a more desirable outcome
imder most plausible circimistances.
Undera quota, the threat of smuggling makesthe demand curveappearmoreelastic than it wouldif smuggling
were not feasible. Further, the demand curve under the quota and smuggling can appear more elastic than it would
under an ad valorem tariff.
alternative toassumption (ni) is that, at R=Ift, The main point ofeither
assumptionis that the monopolist's maximizing behavior does not result in smugglingfor all R.
17 Naturally, a quota set above the free trade levelmayalso be binding, but the case is not interesting since there is
no welfare justification for imposing a quota at that level.
1S
The linear restriction is sufficient, not necessary and the conclusion probably holds for other functionnal
structures, though it cannot be proven.
It is readily shown that Z^<i2,<=>T<T and €(^,i^)oro>r, where Ts(;;y<y').
With legal imports we have shown >0, s 0, <0, (^/(9r) > 0
Q'+S'+1^ /^)< 0. Thus, as legal imports increase (the tariff decreases), output (and perhaps smuggling)
decrease, but total consiunption rises, hence: {SQ'I^ e
21 At (i.e.at r = Tq) thesmuggling function is not differentiable; i.e., as ,(<3S/<^)<0, andas
L-¥ , (cSj^) = 0, increasing thelikelihood ofa solution at . Similarly, imder a quota, neither theoutput
rule nor the smuggling rule is differentiable at , raising the likelihood of a solution there.
22This is a sufficient, not necessary, conditionand the inequali^ will hold elsewhere.
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